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The Role of Auditors in the Nigerian Banking Crisis 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In market societies people routinely have to transact with faceless 
corporations about whom they have little personal knowledge. In such 
societies external auditing and auditors are promoted as a trust engendering 
technology and watchdog with the capacity to promote a particular kind of 
social order. Investors and depositors in a number of banks and companies in 
Nigeria have lost several billions of Naira due to the anti-social practices of 
accountants and auditors, which has resulted in the distress of a number of 
banks and companies. The purpose of this paper is to stimulate debate about 
contemporary auditing and the role of accountants and auditing firms in 
causing the collapse of banks. The paper locates the role of auditors within 
the broader dynamics of professionalism and the pursuit of profits to argue 
that major accountancy firms are becoming more and more willing to increase 
their profits by indulging in anti-social practices that show scant regard for 
social norms and even legal rules and regulations. Contrary to their claims to 
be protecting the public interest, accountants and auditors may be partly 
responsible for cases of distress and the collapse of banks in Nigeria, as they 
failed to qualify their reports when there were indications of financial 
difficulties in the banks. There is also evidence to show that auditors have 
collected large sums in audit and non-audit fees. Such events raise questions 
about the value of company audits, auditor independence and the quality of 
audit work. This paper argues that the basic auditing model is flawed since it 
makes auditors financially dependent on companies. The conventional 
approach to ‘audit quality’ is also inadequate as it pays little attention to the 
organisational pursuit of profits and the social context of auditing. The paper 
encourages reflection on contemporary practices and on the role of 
accountants and auditing firms in corporate collapse, and offers some 
suggestions for reform. 
 
Keywords: Accounting Firms, Accountants, Auditors, Banking Crisis, 
Professional Misconduct, Banks. 
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The Role of Auditors in the Nigerian Banking Crisis 
 
I. Introduction 
In societies marked by divisions of expert labour, external auditing is 
promoted as a trust engendering technology with the capacity to promote a 
certain kind of social order (Power, 1999). Accountants, as auditors, have 
cemented their status and privileges on the basis of claims that their expertise 
enables them to mediate uncertainty and construct independent, objective, 
true and fair accounts of corporate affairs (Sikka, 2009). It has been argued, 
however, that such claims are not good indicators of corporate performance, 
because capitalist economies are inherently prone to crises (O’Connor, 1987; 
Sikka, 2009). Furthermore, the claims of expertise are frequently affected by 
unexpected corporate collapses, fraud, financial crime and the general crisis 
of capitalism (Baker, 2007; Sikka, 2009; Sikka et al, 2009)  
 
Since 2007, major Western economies have been experiencing a deepening 
banking and financial crisis arising from subprime lending practices by banks, 
which in turn has restricted the availability of credit and has led to what has 
been described as the ‘credit crunch’ (Sikka et al, 2009). Some commentators 
have attributed this economic crisis to the unethical practices of corporate 
bank managers and to the inability of auditors to expose such anti-social 
practices from previous audits (Broad Street Journal, 21 October 2009; Sikka, 
2009). Some auditors may have failed to comply with expected standards. If a 
company fails shortly after being audited, the auditors may be blamed for 
conducting an inferior audit (Dopuch, 1988). Thus, whenever there is a 
financial scandal, it must be questioned whether the auditors carried out their 
duties and obligations with due care and diligence. 
 
In Nigeria the spate of corporate failures witnessed in the financial sector in 
the early 1990s brought auditors into sharp focus and caused the Nigerian 
public to question the role of accountants and auditors (Okike, 2004; Bakre, 
2007; Ajibolade, 2008). Furthermore, the investigations launched by the 
regulators and other stakeholders into the cases of distress and disclosure 
revealed that accountants and auditors were implicated (NDIC, 1995). With 
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the recent banking crisis in Nigeria members of the auditing profession in 
Nigeria are once again in the limelight, as the banking crisis and the revelation 
of unethical practices by bank executives and board members has raised 
many questions about the ethical standards of the accounting profession and 
about the integrity of financial reports issued by professional accountants 
(ThisDay, 9 December 2009). The question has been raised as a result of the 
failure on the part of accountants and auditors to alert regulators when they 
have discovered fraud and other irregularities in company records (Bakre, 
2007; Ajibolade, 2008; Okike, 2009; Neu et al, 2010).  
 
In respect of the banking crisis, attention has focused on the role of 
accountants and auditors who have been involved. Accountants and auditors 
may be expected to report financial irregularities in company accounts by 
enhancing transparency and accountability and by developing techniques for 
fraud detection. However, an emerging body of literature argues that 
accounting professionals have increasingly used their expertise to conceal 
and promote anti-social practices (Sikka, 2008a; US Senate Permanent Sub-
Committee on Investigations, 2005; Bakre 2007). For example, Akintola 
Williams and Deloitte (AWD) was indicted for facilitating the falsification of the 
accounts of Afribank Plc and for deliberately overstating the profits of Cadbury 
Nigeria Plc. It has been reported that between 1990 and 1994 the Nigerian 
economy lost more than N6 billion ($42.9 million) to fraud within the banking 
sector alone (Bakre, 2007). 
 
The social cost of the banking crisis is difficult to estimate, but huge amounts 
of public money are being used to bail out distressed banks (Sikka, 2009). In 
2008, almost every Reserve Bank across the globe, in collaboration with 
finance ministries, was forced to adopt extraordinary measures to stave off 
the collapse of the financial institutions and to restore confidence in the 
banking system. Some countries, such as the UK, took direct stakes in their 
banks as a temporary measure in order to ensure that they kept lending. The 
German and French governments offered to guarantee inter-bank deposits to 
achieve the same purpose, while the US government rolled out the 
Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act authorising the US Treasury 
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Department to spend up to $700 billion to purchase distressed assets from 
sick banks and to make a direct capital injection into those institutions (The 
Guardian, 30 August 2009). 
 
While the global recession was biting hard on advanced economies, the 
governors of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had stated that ‘what the rest 
of the world is now trying to do as the bailout option was what Nigeria did 
about four years ago, through a pro-active initiative, the result of which we are 
celebrating today’ (ThisDay, 16 October 2008). Less than a year later, 
however, Nigerians were awoken to the reality that the Nigerian banks were 
not so stable after all (The Guardian, 21 August 2009). The audit conducted 
by the CBN into the activities of the 24 registered banks in 2009 revealed that 
they were experiencing huge financial difficulties in their operations. As a 
consequence, in August 2009, CBN injected N420 billion ($2.8 billion) into the 
first five banks (Afribank, Finbank, Intercontinental Bank, Oceanic Bank and 
Union Bank) which had failed the CBN audit. Two months later, an additional 
N200 billion ($1.33 billion) was injected to stimulate the liquidity of four other 
banks (BankPHB, Equitorial Trust Bank, Spring Bank and Wema Bank) 
(Nigerian Tribune, 8 December 2009; ThisDay, 12 December 2009). This 
injection of money was done in order to stabilise the banks and to ensure that 
they remained going concerns after their former managers had been sacked 
for reckless lending and for lax corporate governance which had rendered the 
institutions undercapitalised (Nigerian Tribune, 17 August 2009; ThisDay, 12 
December 2009). 
 
Although the global financial and banking crises have attracted the attention 
of policy-makers (TI, 2009) and scholars (Njanike et al, 2009; Sikka, 2009; 
Sikka et al, 2009), comparatively little scholarly attention has focussed on the 
role of auditing firms in facilitating the mismanagement of bank assets, 
liabilities and depositors’ funds in developing countries. This paper therefore 
provides evidence on the inadequacy of audit reports for disclosing non-
performing loans and the mismanagement of banking assets. Such evidence 
can help understand the auditing practices which have been adopted, but 
which are in direct conflict with the express claims of auditors and 
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accountants to be acting in an ethical and socially responsible way. This 
paper contributes to the on-going debate on the usefulness of auditing and 
the need for accounting professionals to ensure that they continue to play a 
leading role in providing credibility to published financial statements and in 
maintaining the confidence of depositors in banks and investors in the capital 
market. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Part II examines the literature on the role 
of auditing in corporate collapse, particularly in respect of banking failures. 
Part III considers the theoretical framework of professionalism and the pursuit 
of profits. It is argued that, despite the regulatory framework governing the 
professional activities of auditors and accountants, the pursuit of profits and 
systemic pressure to increase corporate performance have been prioritised. 
Part IV describes the auditing environment in Nigeria in order to provide an 
understanding of the socio-political and economic contexts within which such 
accounting and auditing practices are embedded. Part V provides empirical 
evidence on the role of auditors in bank failures and the recent banking crisis 
in Nigeria by way of case-studies. Part VI concludes the paper by providing a 
summary and discussion of the issues raised and offers suggestions for 
reform. 
 
II. A Review of the Literature 
This section examines the literature on the role of accountants and auditors in 
anti-social practices, a role which seems to deviate from their primary role as 
external watchdogs of shareholder wealth and as protectors of the public 
interest. In recent years accountants have been accused of being involved in 
what has been described as harmful and anti-social behaviour purely for the 
sake of high fees (Christensen, 2006; Bakre, 2007). 
Traditionally, regulators, investors and financial analysts have relied 
upon corporate financial statements to make sense of bank liabilities, risk and 
economic exposure, but this has been highly problematic (Stiglitz, 2003; 
Arnold and Sikka, 2001). The credibility of financial statements prepared by 
directors of limited liability companies and audited by external auditors 
remains the primary means of informing shareholders and other stakeholders 
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about the financial performance, progress and position of the business 
(Tahinakis and Nicolaou, 2004; Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007; Sikka et al, 2009; 
Dabor and Adeyemi, 2009; Evbodaghe, 2009). The key issue in the field of 
auditing and assurance is to recognise that auditing can be of even greater 
value if it looks beyond traditional financial issues and focuses on areas that 
matter to a wide range of stakeholders and the public (Sikka, 2009; 
Evbodaghe, 2009). It has been argued, however, that audit methodology 
which was appropriate for the industrial age may not be sufficiently broad 
enough for the information technology age when assets are intangible, 
commerce is electronic, markets are global and the pace of change is ever-
accelerating (Sikka, 2009; Sikka et al, 2009; Asein, 2009). It also seems that 
auditors face credibility issues. Thus, for instance, there is a widespread 
public perception that auditors lack independence from company executives 
and, as a result, there are concerns about the quality of audits (Evbodaghe, 
2009; Sikka et al, 2009; Sikka, 2009). 
 
The involvement and culpability of accountants and auditors in unethical 
practices and conflicts of interest have long been documented by critical 
accounting scholars in developed and developing countries (García-Benau 
and Humphrey, 1992; McHugh and Stamp, 1992; Sikka and Willmott, 1995; 
Cousins et al, 2000; Mitchell et al, 2001; Bakre, 2007; Sikka, 2009; Sikka et 
al, 2009; Gyénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010). Recent time have witnessed 
the collapse of a number of corporate giants, such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Arthur Andersen in the USA and BCCI in the UK. The Nigerian business 
community is also plagued with ethical problems associated with business 
collapse (Bakre, 2007). Unethical business behaviour and corporate scandals 
involving large companies, such as African Petroleum Plc, Cadbury Nigeria 
Plc and Lever Brothers Plc, have been reported (Bakre, 2007; Ajibolade, 
2008). 
 
Enron, the Texas-based energy trading company, caused one of the major 
scandals which shook up the auditing profession. Enron caused a crisis in 
respect of the confidence placed in auditors and the reliability of financial 
reporting. Arthur Andersen, Enron’s accountant, was accused of a conflict of 
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interest which led to it being accused of professional misconduct and other 
unethical accounting practices (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002). The quality of the 
audit and the independence of the auditors were questionable because Arthur 
Andersen received not just audit fees but fees for non-audit services. For 
example, it earned $55 million for non-audit services and there were regular 
exchanges of employees within Enron from Arthur Andersen, thereby 
affecting the independence of the auditors and causing a conflict of interest. In 
2002 Arthur Andersen was also implicated in the collapse of WorldCom, one 
of the biggest telecommunications companies in the US. Arthur Andersen, as 
auditor, was found to have failed to have taken proper steps to detect 
accounting irregularities (Wong, 2004). 
 
The investigations of the Home Bank failure in Canada in 1916 by the Royal 
Commission revealed that the bank was probably insolvent at the time of the 
complaints to the minister of finance, and that the statement issued by the 
management and attested to by the auditor did not reflect the true financial 
position of the bank (Lew and Richardson, 1992). On 25 March 1985, due to 
capital inadequacy, Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) was bailed-out with 
$255 million of new capital from the Canadian Federal Government (Neu and 
Wright, 1992). As a consequence, the report of the Royal Commission chaired 
by Judge Estey was particularly critical of the role of auditors and of the 
Inspector General (Neu and Wright, 1992; Lew and Richardson, 1992). After 
the investigations, the Commission concluded (quoting from Neu and Wright, 
1992) that: 
 
‘The bank’s auditors, Peat Marwick Mitchell and Co. and Clarkson 
Gordon, take some of the rap for not being more forceful in presenting 
their opinions about the problems that they saw at the bank. Their 
decision to issue an unqualified opinion on the financial statements 
presented to shareholders is also questionable’. (p. 652.) 
 
Similarly, the investigations into the collapse of BCCI implicated the external 
auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), who acted as both private 
consultant and tax advisor to the bank’s management in order to enhance its 
own private profits (Arnold and Sikka, 2001; Mitchell et al, 2001). The auditing 
of BCCI provided evidence which showed that the auditor, PwC, had 
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compromised its independence by accepting loans and financial benefits from 
BCCI’s management (Arnold and Sikka, 2001). Barings Bank collapsed in 
1995 as a result unauthorised transactions in excess of £800m by the rogue 
trader Nick Leeson (Accountancy Age, 29 April 2002). The liquidator of 
Barings, KPMG, blamed the former auditors, Coopers and Lybrand and 
Deloitte and Touche, for negligently failing to detect the losses caused by Nick 
Leeson in Singapore (Accountancy Age, 8 May 2002). As a result, in 2002 
Coopers and Lybrand and Gareth Maldwyn Davies, a Coopers and Lybrand 
partner, were fined £250,000 and £25,000 respectively for their role in the 
collapse of Barings Bank (Accountancy Age, 29 April 2002). 
 
On 25 August 1991, the world’s financial institution auditor, KPMG Peat 
Marwick, was fired by a governmental agency for the audit of Fokus Bank (the 
third largest bank in Norway). The reason given by the head of the 
Governmental Bank Insurance Fund, Tormod Hermansen, was that KPMG 
had gone beyond its auditing remit by providing Fokus Bank with advice 
(Ruud, 1992). Thus, it was reported that KPMG had charged Fokus Bank 
NOK 4.4 million for examining the 1990 financial report, of which only one-
third of the fee (NOK 1.4 million) related to audit services while the remaining 
two-thirds was payment for advisory services. It has been claimed that the 
advisory services assisted Fokus Bank in its decision-making, and thereby 
threatened the independence of the auditor (Ruud, 1992). 
 
A number of recent studies have questioned the value of company audits, 
auditor independence, the quality of audit work, economic incentives for good 
audits and the knowledge base of auditors (Sikka, 2009; Sikka et al, 2009). 
These studies have argued that the issuance of audit reports is subject to 
organisational and regulatory politics, that fee dependency impairs claims of 
independence and has the capacity to silence auditors, and that the 
intensification of financial capitalism poses questions about the knowledge 
base of auditors (Sikka, 2009; Sikka et al, 2009). A study by Sikka (2009) has 
shown that distressed financial enterprises in the UK, USA, Germany, Iceland, 
The Netherlands, France and Switzerland have received unqualified audit 
opinions on their financial statements published immediately prior to the public 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 9, 2010 
 168
declaration of their financial difficulties; and that these opinions were provided 
by the big four accounting firms, namely PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte 
and Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. 
 
A number of studies have documented the role of accountants and auditors in 
unethical practices and other professional misconduct in the public service 
and in the corporate sector in Nigeria (Adeyemi, 2004; Bakre, 2007; Ajibolade, 
2008). A study by Bakre (2007) has documented various cases in which 
accountants and external auditors in collaboration with the management and 
directors of companies falsified and deliberately overstated company 
accounts. Investigations into the financial report of Afribank implicated 
Akintola Williams & Deloitte in facilitating an overstatement of the bank’s 
account by the management (Bakre, 2007). Other Nigerian cases have also 
been documented in which a number of professional accounting firms were 
involved in, and indicted for, anti-social practices in conflict with their 
professional claims to be acting in the public interest; and it was suggested 
that the matter needed further investigation (Bakre, 2007).  
 
The causes of audit failure have been attributed to poor audit reporting 
resulting from sloppy accounting, inadequate regulation, crony capitalism, 
multiple regulations, and economic and political factors influencing the 
incentives of managers and auditors (Dabor and Adeyemi, 2009; Sikka 2009). 
It has also been stated that, where there is a separation of ownership from the 
control of a business, there is a tendency for managers of companies to 
engage in fraudulent financial reporting in order to maximise their own 
personal welfare to the detriment of the interests of the users of financial 
statements, the investing public and bank depositors (Sikka et al, 2009; Dabor 
and Adeyemi, 2009). Bank failures have also been associated with 
endogenous forces, lack of scruple, lack of knowledge and information, poor 
judgement, speculation, greed and fraud. In Nigeria the bank failures of the 
Abacha era were attributed to an inadequate capital base, the fraudulent self-
serving and corrupt practices of the owners and managers, the meddlesome 
interference of board members in the day-to-day running of the institutions 
and to regulatory laxity (ThisDay, 18 August 2009).  
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The recent banking crisis in Nigeria has shown the role that regulatory 
laxity, greed and avarice have played in the management of banks. It has 
been claimed that towards the end of former CBN Governor Soludo’s era at 
the Apex Bank that the regulator got too close to some banks for comfort and 
that ‘the damage that did to credibility was enormous because at a point it 
became difficult to ascertain what was happening between the banks and the 
CBN’ (ThisDay, 18 August 2009). 
 
A number of scholars have shown that many accountants, particularly 
members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), have 
been responsible for the crisis in the banking and manufacturing sectors in 
Nigeria (Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007). These studies show that the regulatory 
framework in Nigeria is weak, because members of the professional firms 
implicated in a number of anti-social practices in Nigeria have not yet been 
sanctioned (Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007). The studies have suggested that the 
accounting profession in Nigeria and other regulators (such as the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, the National Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Nigerian 
Accounting Standards Board) must continue to monitor developments in both 
the external and internal reporting environments. 
  
III. Professionalism and the Pursuit of Profits 
 
Traditionally, the literature on the professions draws attention to the 
processes by which professionals (such as accountants, bankers and 
lawyers) have mobilised claims of ethical codes, higher education, the 
command of knowledge and claims to be serving the public interest in order to 
cement their own social power. Claims to professionalism include the 
existence of ethical codes whereby it is claimed that professionals possess 
theoretical and practical knowledge and exercise high levels of skill, technical 
conduct and social responsibility. Appeals to such idealised self-images help 
to solicit trust and legitimise professional power and responsibility (Sikka, and 
Hampton, 2005). In other words, such claims are used to advance 
professional social, economic and political interests and to secure control of 
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markets and niches (Millerson, 1964; Willmott, 1986; Macdonald, 1995; Grey, 
1998; Morris and Empson, 1998; Leicht and Fennell, 2001). 
  
It has been argued that professional monopoly and professional claims are 
dependent upon state recognition, in other words upon charter status (Cooper 
et al, 1988; Uche, 2002; Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007). State recognition by way 
of charter status enables accountancy professional bodies to be self-regulated 
and for accounting firms to have control over the auditing of public companies 
(see Bakre, 2007). The two professional bodies in Nigeria, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and the Association of National 
Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), enjoy guaranteed charter status and the self-
regulation of accountancy1. In order to continue to enjoy the support of the 
Nigerian state through their charter status, self-regulation and the support of 
their clients, ICAN and ANAN have claimed to be committed to promoting the 
highest standards of competence, practice and ethical conduct amongst 
members (Bakre, 2007). However, it has been argued (e.g. by Willmott, 1986) 
that professional associations are primarily political bodies whose main 
purpose is to advance the interests of their members. Thus, their professional 
claims allow professional associations (such as accountancy) to justify any 
charter status and monopoly power that they have received from the state 
(Bakre, 2007). Such claims are essential for professional groups to continue 
to diffuse any crisis the profession may face in society (Neu and Wright, 1992; 
Bakre, 2007). Bakre (2007) has argued that the extent to which the 
accountancy professional bodies, accountants and auditors rely on their 
charter status and monopoly power from the state to pursue their own 
personal interests in the name of protecting the public interest depends on the 
socio-political and cultural environments within which the accountants and 
auditors operate. 
 
Such an exclusive privilege over the auditing market provides a substantial 
economic and financial benefit to members of the accounting profession 
(Okike, 2004). In return, however, the public have a right to expect benefits in 
                                                 
1 This is by virtue of Act of Parliament No. 15 of the 1965 for ICAN and Act 
No. 70 of 1993 for ANAN.  
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the form of improved financial reporting and the assurance of a stable banking 
sector and capital market (Okike, 2004). A number of scholars have argued 
that, although certain occupational groups, particularly accountants, have 
professed themselves to be promoting the common good, they have not in 
fact subordinated their own interests to the common good (Shaw, 1946; 
Willmott, 1986; Bakre, 2007). Bakre (2007) has argued that ‘the operating 
activities of the two recognised professional bodies in Nigeria, ICAN and 
ANAN, have been to protect the interests of their members against the 
general claims of protecting the Nigerian public interest’ (p. 283). Uche (2002) 
has argued that ‘their works almost always stress the technical qualities of 
accounting while underplaying the social and political formation of its practices 
and standards’ (p. 472). 
 
The situation may sometimes become more complex and even compounded 
by the contradictory position in which professional accountants who claim to 
be protecting the public interest find themselves. However, the right to 
improved financial reporting cannot be assumed in a society that is highly 
infested with corruption and anti-social financial practices. This is because, in 
a corrupt society, the quality of accounting systems and of accounting data 
generated may be doubtful and so may the reliability of information presented 
in audited financial statements (Uche, 2002; Okike, 2004; Bakre 2008). 
Therefore in a society like Nigeria, where corruption, a lack of checks and 
balances and a lack of a national integrity system is endemic and almost 
institutionalised, the independence of some auditors in discharging their 
statutory duties may be in doubt (Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007). In a corrupt 
environment, Wallace and Parker (1991) posit that the risk of audit failure is 
high and that auditors may not to be able to rely on formalised audit 
procedures but may be forced to employ more flexible and less formalised 
audit mechanisms. 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that, as auditors in market societies are 
remunerated by the client company rather than by an independent body, this 
inevitably makes them dependent upon directors for their fees and profits 
(Sikka, et al, 2009). It has been argued that auditing firms may legitimise their 
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status by appealing to ‘professionalism’, but in common with other capitalist 
enterprises they seek to increase profits and market niches (Mitchell and 
Sikka, 2002; Sikka and Hampton, 2005). The internationalisation of 
professional services shaped by intense competition and the pressure to 
increase earnings and accumulate wealth has continued to create 
opportunities for professionals and the process has been driven by both 
economic and financial gain. Hanlon (1994) stated that:  
 
‘In respect of professionals in the private sector the emphasis is very 
firmly placed on them being commercial and on performing services to 
customers, rather than on them being public spirited on behalf of either 
the public or the state’. (p. 150.)  
 
Thus, professional accounting organisations prioritise private profit and 
encourage competitive individualism with an emphasis on retaining the client, 
pleasing the customer and promoting business virtues that increase profits 
(Grey, 1998; Leicht and Fennell, 2001; Gunz and Gunz, 2006; Suddaby, 
Cooper and Greenwood, 2007). It has been argued that auditing firms have 
used their control of auditing markets to colonise adjacent markets in order to 
sell consultancy services to auditing clients. It has also been argued that the 
profit motive informs the dynamics of accounting firms (Sikka at al, 2009). 
Generally, the auditing model positions auditors as the guardians at the gate, 
watching over firms with the public interest in mind, but it has been argued by 
Sikka et al (2009) that ‘the success of both corporate watchdog and protector 
of public interest is measured by revenues, profits and market shares rather 
than by pursuit of any broader social goals’ (p. 139). Mitchell and Sikka (2002) 
have argued that the entrepreneurial environment in which accountants 
operate has not been accompanied by morally upright behaviour: 
 
‘The expansion of the entrepreneurial accountancy firm has not been 
accompanied by moral constraints that require consideration of the 
social consequences of their organisational practices. In such an 
environment, numerous practices are considered to be acceptable as 
long as they generate private profits’. (p. 10.) 
 
 
The commercialisation of audits whereby auditors are dependent upon 
directors for their fees may result in auditors being unable to maintain a 
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sufficient ‘distance’ and unable to deliver independent audits. Auditors may 
also develop strategies that maximise audit profits, possibly by performing 
less stringent audits or by developing strategies which increases private 
profits but reduce quality (Sikka et al, 2009). The public is persuaded to 
believe that auditors collect relevant and reliable evidence in order to form 
their opinion. The reality is that in their pursuit of profits, auditors do not 
always bother with such niceties (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002). This is because 
audit assignments are based on tight budgets and idealised procedures which 
limit audit verifications and examination of records to specific items.   
The quality of audits is dependent not only on the technical skills of 
audit teams, but also on the organisational values and labour processes 
embedded within audit firms. Thus, some firms may impose tight time 
constraints on audit staff even though such constraints play a major part in 
audit failures and in the incompleteness of audit work. As a result, audit staff 
may carry out unprofessional practices such as accepting doubtful audit 
evidence, failing to test the required number of items in a sample, or falsifying 
audit working papers in order to give the impression that the work had been 
done (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002). As the audit review process cannot 
completely reperform the audit, irregular audit practices rarely come to light 
before the completion of an auditing assignment. In this audit environment of 
tight time constraints, competition and the pursuit of higher profits, auditing 
firms seek ways of achieving efficiency. A common practice is to use 
checklists for controlling, planning and recording an audit. Such devices 
standardise audits and make the process much more mechanical and 
predictable. It has been claimed, however, that this ‘checklist mentality’ 
encourages irregular practices because it is subjective and discretionary (see 
Mitchell and Sikka, 2002). 
 
It has been argued that the environment in which auditors operate will usually 
determine the extent to which they can successfully discharge their role as 
society watchdogs (Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007). The auditing environment in 
Nigeria is considered next. 
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IV. The Socio-Political and Economic Contexts of Auditing in Nigeria  
In order to understand the general environment in which auditors and 
accountants operate in Nigeria, it is necessary to consider the social-political 
and economic contexts in which auditors work. Nigeria is located in West 
Africa in the Eastern corner of the Gulf of Guinea, an arm of the Atlantic 
Ocean (Sklar, 2004; Uzoigwe, 2004). It is the second largest country in Africa 
(Uzoigwe, 2004). It has a population of about 145 million (US Senate Sub-
Committee on Investigations, 2010)2. Nigeria has grown from three regions at 
independence to a federation of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory. 
 
Since its independence in 1960 Nigeria has been ruled mainly by military 
regimes with some democratic interludes. Nigeria has witnessed frequent 
violent changes in the attempt by various parties to control the apparatus of 
the state (Uche, 2002). Thus, stable and accountable democratic institutions 
have never really been established. In addition, Nigeria has suffered a long 
history of gross mismanagement of its economy and of corruption at all levels 
of government (Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2008). Accountability in all facets of the 
economy is an essential ingredient for the economic development of any 
nation. Achieving adequate accountability in Nigeria has, however, been a 
major problem which successive governments have had to contend with 
because of widespread corruption and anti-social practices in almost all 
spheres of public and private endeavours (Okike, 2004). It has been argued 
that, despite successive governments claiming to have implemented various 
economic and political programmes to curb anti-social practices, Nigeria 
continues to be enmeshed in huge financial criminal practices (Bakre, 2008).  
 
                                                 
2  In 2006 Nigeria's population stood at 140,003,542, according to Samu'ila 
Danko Makama, Chairman of the National Population Commission (NPC). 
This was an increase of about 20 million on the 1991 census figure of 120 
million (ThisDay, 30 December, 2006). The distribution among the six geo-
political zones were: North West 35.79 million; North Central 20.27 million; 
North East 18.97 million; South West 27.58 million; South South 21.01 million; 
and South East 16.38 million (Nigeria World, 11 January 2007). 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 9, 2010 
 175
Financial statement quality is an indispensable component of the 
infrastructure needed to develop a mature capital market and a viable banking 
sector. Thus accountants and auditors play a key role in ensuring adequate 
internal controls in business organisations (such as banks) and ensuring the 
reliability of the financial information reported in company financial statements 
(Okike, 2009, Evbodaghe, 2009). For example, the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act 1990 (CAMA 1990) imposes a legal duty on chartered 
accountants as external auditors to examine financial statements not only to 
determine whether they represent a true and fair view of the state of affairs of 
the entity and are free of any material misstatements, but also to ascertain 
whether they conform to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), other relevant legislation and standards, and whether there are 
errors, misstatements or fraud in the accounts (Okike, 1998; Okike, 2004; 
Guardian, 30 August 2009). 
 
In addition, CAMA 1990 provides that public companies should have an audit 
committee comprised of an equal number of directors and representatives of 
the shareholders of the company (subject to a maximum number of six 
members)3. Members of the audit committee are not entitled to remuneration 
and they are subject to annual re-election. The audit committee is also 
expected to be independent and to be able to understand basic financial 
statements. Although such audit committees ought on behalf of the other 
members of the company (i.e. the shareholders) to make valuable 
contributions to the efficient running of the company, in practice members of 
audit committees are often weak and can be compromised because of fringe 
benefits, executive remuneration and rewards from directors. 
 
There are no state guaranteed monopolies for engineers, scientists, 
mathematicians, computer experts and other wealth creators, but audit work 
is reserved for accountants belonging to a handful of accountancy trade 
associations (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002). In Nigeria, there are two main 
professional accountancy bodies: the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
                                                 
3 See ss.359(3),(4) Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 Cap 20 
laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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Nigeria (ICAN); and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria 
(ANAN) (Uche, 2002; Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007; Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). 
The Federal Parliament Act No. 15 of 1965 gave ICAN charter status and a 
monopoly to regulate the accountancy profession in Nigeria and to make 
regulations governing disciplinary actions against erring members (see ICAN 
Act 1965; Uche, 2002; Okike 2004; Bakre, 2007; Adegite, 2009). Both bodies 
are in essence self-regulating and both memberships have elected Governing 
Council members. In common with accountancy practice in other jurisdictions, 
there is no separate statutory regulator of the audit profession. 
 
Auditing has been a real boom for accountancy firms in Nigeria, where there 
are nearly 700,000 registered companies plus hospitals, universities, local 
authorities, pension funds, schools, trade unions, housing associations and 
charities which all need to have their books audited by an accountant 
(Adegite, 2009). Not surprisingly, accountancy is an attractive career. Nigeria 
has approximately 40,000 qualified accountants4. Thus, ICAN has produced 
27,000 chartered accountants since inception (Adegite, 2009), while ANAN 
has 13,000 registered members (ANAN Membership Register). 
 
It has been argued that ICAN’S inability to maintain its state-granted chartered 
status and monopoly, especially its inability to control the behaviour of its 
erring members, led to the recognition of ANAN in order to provide more 
competition in the accountancy profession (Uche, 2002; Bakre, 2007). As a 
result, the ICAN Act 1965 and the ANAN Act 1993 gave ICAN and ANAN 
statutory powers to control and regulate the accountancy market, to determine 
the future direction of the profession and, most importantly, to control the 
behaviour of their respective members (Uche, 2002; Okike, 2004; Bakre, 
2007). Thus, for instance, in order to be admitted as a member of the 
accountancy profession, a person must pass ICAN’s examinations and 
complete the practical training prescribed (s.8(1)(a) ICAN Act 1965). Similarly, 
with ANAN, a prospective accountant must have a university degree in 
                                                 
4  ICAN members dominate accounting and auditing services in the private 
sector, while ANAN members are mostly employed in the public sector. 
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accountancy or its equivalent and must thereafter attend the College of 
Accountancy for one year (Uche, 2002). 
 
Under the provisions of the ICAN Act 1965 the accounting and auditing 
profession is required to provide the necessary assurance of ‘fairness in the 
conduct of banking businesses’. In addition, section 29(1) of the Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions Act 1991 (BOFIA 1991) provides that banks must 
annually appoint an ‘approved auditor’:  
 
‘Every bank shall appoint annually a person approved by the bank . . . 
[an ‘approved auditor’] whose duties shall be to make to the 
shareholders a report upon the annual balance sheet and profit and 
loss account of the bank and such report shall contain a statement as 
to the matters and other information as may be prescribed, from time to 
time, by the bank’  
 
In the 1980s, a mixture of local and international firms provided accounting 
services in Nigeria. Thus, for example, Arthur Andersen, Coopers and 
Lybrand, Peat Marwick and PriceWaterhouse had offices in Nigeria. In terms 
of the banking industry, international auditing firms conducted 65 per cent of 
the audits, with Peat Marwick being the auditor of record for Nigeria’s three 
largest banks (Nue et al, 2010). In terms of the banks that would ultimately 
fail, international auditing firms provided the audits in 63 per cent of the cases, 
suggesting there was little difference in audit quality between international and 
local firms (Nue et al, 2010). 
 
The following section outlines the research method deployed in this paper to 
discuss the role of professionals in unethical practices. 
 
Research Methods 
To understand the role and involvement of accountancy firms and external 
auditors in the banking crisis in Nigeria, this paper relies primarily on archival 
records which include press reports, regulator and government reports on the 
banking crisis, annual reports, evidence of falsification of accounts and 
evidence on the role of auditors. This evidence is used to compile case-
studies. Although this evidence may be incomplete and somewhat biased, it 
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nevertheless provides evidence of anti-social financial practices. There are 
considerable problems in collecting data because unethical behaviour is 
masked with secrecy and because it is extremely rare for participants or 
auditors to volunteer details of their practice. For this reason it is only possible 
in this paper to refer to publicly available evidence which provides only a 
glimpse of the bigger underlying problems. Information on ethical practices by 
regulators who have conducted investigations on the activities of the banks 
may, however, shed light on the role of auditors in company collapse and in 
the recent banking crisis in Nigeria.  
 
Although a comprehensive investigation and critique of the politics and 
problems of auditing in Nigeria is beyond the scope of this paper because of 
the reasons given above, the paper nonetheless seeks to explore some basic 
practices which are deeply embedded in current auditing practices. These 
relate to the appropriateness of the basic auditing model, the quality of audits 
and the variability of financial statements. An analysis of documentary reports 
is particularly useful in this respect in that it not only serves to highlight the 
role and value of audit practices, but also helps to frame and contextualise the 
active role of professionals and auditors in facilitating unethical practices in 
Nigeria. 
 
The following section provides evidence on the role and involvement of 
accountants and auditors in banking failure in Nigeria  
 
V. Some Evidence 
Although professional accountants and accounting firms claim to act in the 
public interest, they have been implicated in various acts of professional 
misconduct and in falsification and deliberate financial engineering in Nigeria 
(ThisDay, 16 October 2006; The Punch, 14 December 2006; Bakre, 2007). 
The ‘big four’ accounting forms in Nigeria are KPMG, Ernst and Young, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Akintola Williams and Deloitte. These four 
accounting firms have been implicated in falsification and financial 
engineering scandals in Nigeria. Paradoxically, this suggests that the way in 
which professional firms conduct their audit has financial implications for the 
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financial sector and the capital market in Nigeria which has not been under 
public scrutiny in recent years. The cases below provide evidence on the role 
of auditors in corporate scandals in Nigeria.  
 
CASE 1: Akintola Williams Deloitte and Afribank Plc and Cadbury Plc 
Akintola Williams Deloitte (AWD), one of the big four accounting firms in 
Nigeria, was external auditor to Afribank Plc and Cadbury Plc. AWD has 
about 40 partners and audits the accounts and serves as reporting 
accountants to many big companies in the capital market (SEC Administrative 
Proceedings Committee, 2008). In 2006 AWD was in two different cases 
accused of account falsification and financial engineering during its audit of 
two companies, Afribank Plc and Cadbury Nigeria Plc. 
 
In the case of Afribank Plc, AWD was exposed by the former Managing 
Director of Afribank Plc who alleged that the accounts of the company had 
been manipulated by the Afribank board and the external auditor AWD 
(ThisDay, 16 October 2006). However, AWD denied their involvement in any 
unethical practices: 
 
‘In our thirty years of existence, this is the first time someone would 
accuse us of modifying our report. We apply the rule 100 per cent, we 
do not bend the rules at all. Our firm has a world renowned in-house 
audit approach system called Deloitte audit that ensures our audits are 
carried out in full compliance with all applicable audit and accounting 
standards both local and international’. (ThisDay, 16 October 2006.)   
 
At the completion of the audit exercise by the external auditor, AWD, the draft 
accounts for the period under review showed that Afribank had recorded 
gross earnings of N16 billion, a before tax loss of N6.3 billion and an after tax 
loss of N6.9 billion, total assets of N127.5 billion, and the shareholders’ fund 
dropping to N17.85 billion compared with the 2005 amount of N21.4 billion 
(ThisDay, 16 October 2006). According to the former Managing Director, the 
main reason for the wide difference between the management figures and the 
audited figures was simply as a result of huge non-performance risk assets in 
the previous year, which the bank had been carrying erroneously as 
performance risk assets. This account manipulation occurred with the 
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knowledge of the Board of Directors and on the professional advice of the 
external auditors, AWD (ThisDay, 16 October 2006). 
 
Despite evidence of irregularities and unethical practices in the accounts of 
Afribank Plc, the Chief Executive of AWD claimed that its audit report on the 
Bank’s accounts was a ‘true, fair and accurate’ representation of its financial 
position for the year under review. He also claimed that the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) had certified the audit as being satisfactory (ThisDay, 16 
October 2006).  
 
While the auditor, AWD, claimed that the CBN had given the audit a clean bill 
of health, the CBN, due to public demand, sent its examiners to re-investigate 
the accounting books of Afribank Plc. The Nigerian Stock Exchange and the 
House Committee also launched separate investigations into the alleged 
financial malpractice by the Bank’s directors and its auditor. The Board, 
management and external auditors of the Bank were asked to confirm to the 
Committee whether the recently published account had taken into account all 
material facts, such as Director-related loans and full provisions for bad loans. 
Despite the scale of the alleged irregularities and unethical practices 
perpetrated by the Board of Afribank in collaboration with the company’s 
auditor, AWD continued to claim that their audit represented an accurate 
representation of the Bank’s financial position. 
 
However, while the case was being investigated by the regulators (the CBN, 
and the Nigerian Stock Exchange) and the House of Representatives 
Committee on the capital market, AWD was implicated in another falsification 
of accounts involving Cadbury Nigeria Plc, a subsidiary of Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas Limited, a group which owns a number of confectionary 
and soft drink brands in 200 countries worldwide. The falsification of the 
company’s accounts was perpetrated by AWD in collaboration with the 
Managing Director/CEO and the Finance Director who was a chartered 
accountant and a Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN) (The Punch, 20 November 2006; ThisDay, 13 December 2006). 
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The investigations by the Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) of the 
Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission (the SEC) confirmed that 
N13,255 billion ($106 million) was the accumulated overstatement for the 
years 2002 to September 2006 and that AWD had audited the published 
accounts for those years as well as carrying out an interim audit for the period 
ended September 2006. APC reported that:  
 
‘In 2005 N7.7 billion ($61.6 million) was credited to the company’s 
account without bankers’ confirmation and supporting note in the 2005 
audited account that AWD did not receive confirmation from any of the 
banks. The materiality of the amount is significant enough to have put 
AWD on enquiry.’ (SEC Administrative Proceedings Committee, 2008.) 
 
In addition, AWD had sent management letters on the company’s 2001-2005 
accounts, but it had failed or refused to note the lapses in the accounts when 
no satisfactory response was given by the company’s management (SEC 
Administrative Proceedings Committee, 2008). Furthermore, AWD, as 
external auditor and a party to the issue, signed, consented to and authorised 
the issuance of an untrue financial statement in the rights circular and failed to 
exercise the due diligence and professionalism they claimed in the discharge 
of their duties in the rights offer of N5 billion ($40 million) unsecured zero 
Coupon Irredeemable Convertible loan stock. Although auditors normally rely 
on documents presented to them by their clients in order to do their work, they 
are required to probe further when put on inquiry as shown in the stock 
certificate of N700 million ($5.6 million), allegedly issued by JOF Limited but 
disclaimed in writing by the alleged issuer, but which was large enough to 
make AWD seek further confirmation, but which it failed to do (SEC 
Administrative Proceedings Committee, 2008). The Administrative 
Proceedings Committee of the Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission 
(2008) further noted that: 
 
‘Professional scepticism generally requires that an auditor should not 
believe documents presented by client on till it sees evidence that they 
are genuine. In Cadbury case, AWD did not probe further or doubt 
documents presented by the company in spite of internal control 
weakness detected and revealed in its management letters.’ (SEC 
Administrative Proceedings Committee, 2008.) 
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It has been argued that AWD, and in particular the partners who had handled 
the company’s account, did not carry out their assignment with the high level 
of professionalism and diligence which they professed to exercise (Bakre, 
2007). 
 
After investigation by the Security and Exchange Commission (the SEC), the 
Managing Director/CEO and the Finance Director of Cadbury Nigeria Plc were 
banned, while the Head of Internal Audit and the Senior Financial 
Accountant/Head of Accounts of Cadbury Nigeria Plc, who were all 
professional accountants and AWD, were suspended from operating in the 
Nigerian capital market because of their role in the scandal (Vanguard, 3 April 
2008; Business Day, 9 April 2008). The SEC Report stated that: 
 
‘They were the masterminds of the financial malpractice perpetrated 
through the falsification of sales figures, over-statement of 
profits/assets and false suppliers of certificates to manipulate its 
financial records/report’. (Vanguard, 3 April 2008; Business Day, 9 April 
2008.) 
 
The role of accountants in the Afribank Plc and Cadbury Nigeria Plc cases 
was shaped by an organisational culture which prioritised high profits and in 
which accountancy firms put the best interests of their clients above their own 
professional code of practice. As a result, Akintola Williams Deloitte (AWD) 
was ordered to pay a fine of N20 million for its failure to handle the accounts 
of the company with due professional diligence. Although AWD was strongly 
reprimanded and warned to desist from engaging in acts that might affect the 
investing public’s confidence in the capital market, the penalty seemed light 
compared with the damage such anti-social practices have on Nigerian 
society. The Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) of the SEC stated 
that: 
 
‘AWD did not probe further or doubt documents presented by the 
Company in spite of the internal control lapses detected and revealed 
in its management letters. That AWD and in particular, the partners that 
handled the Company’s account, did not carry out their assignment 
with the high level of professionalism and diligence expected of a 
reputable accounting firm of its calibre’. (Vanguard, 3 April 2008; 
Business Day, 2008.) 
 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, Vol. 9, 2010 
 183
On account of the above unprofessional misconduct of AWD as auditor, stock 
market consultant and tax manager, AWD was also implicated in tax-related 
advisory matters as such falsified accounts are used for tax returns. However, 
AWD denied the various allegations claiming that:  
 
‘Overall, we are a firm that is known for high integrity and ethical values 
and cannot be accused of suppression of financial information’. 
(ThisDay, 16 October 2006.) 
 
Despite AWD’s claims of ‘high integrity and ethical values’, AWD formally 
resigned as auditors to Cadbury Plc before the completion of the SEC 
investigations, which AWD purported to be in the interest of the shareholders 
and in the spirit of the highest standards of corporate governance. The 
resignation did not allude, however, to any complicity on the part of AWD as 
the investigations had shown. 
 
A number of accountants and auditing firms have been implicated in the crisis 
in banking and manufacturing companies in Nigeria (Bakre, 2007). Thus, it 
has been argued that, despite unqualified audit reports, a number of 
companies still collapse, thereby raising the spectre of unethical behaviour on 
the part of professional accountants. The recent pronouncement by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) on the state of Nigerian banks has been a 
cause of concern for regulators, depositors and shareholders. The role played 
by accounting firms in the recent banking crisis in Nigeria is examined in the 
following case. 
 
Case 2: The Big Four and the Recent Banking Crisis 
Regulators and investors have traditionally relied upon corporate financial 
statements to make sense of bank liabilities, risk and economic exposure, but 
this has been highly problematic (Stiglitz, 2003). In the process of constructing 
a regulatory environment, accountants and the auditing profession were 
enlisted to provide the necessary assurance of ‘fairness in the conduct of 
banking business’ (Nue et al, 2010). However, despite the enlistment of 
auditors as corporate watchdogs, Nigeria has witnessed a number of bank 
failures since independence in 1960. The spate of banking distress 
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experienced in the 1980s prompted the introduction of the regulatory 
framework for the Nigerian banking industry. In 1995 another bout of distress 
occurred in the banking industry when 57 commercial and merchant banks 
went into distress in the first three months of that year. Their illiquidity was put 
at N47.9 billion ($383.2 million), constituting 24.6 per cent of the total deposits 
in the banking sub-sector at that time, and out of the reach of their depositors 
(Newswatch, 24 August 2009). 
 
As a consequence of inadequacies, the liquidity problems often experienced 
by banks in Nigeria led to the raising of the minimum capital base of banks to 
N25 billion ($167 million) in 2004. The re-capitalisation led to there being 25 
banks in 2006, a considerable reduction from the 89 which existed in 2004. 
Nigerian banks saw explosive balance sheet growth in the wake of 
consolidation four years ago, and they went on massive capital raising sprees 
which increased their capacity to lend to companies and to individuals. Risk 
management, however, did not keep pace (Nigerian Tribune, 17 August 
2009). 
 
The evidence shows that, out of the 25 big banks operating in Nigeria after re-
capitalisation, three international accounting firms have been the major 
auditors of the banks (see Table 1) showing the intense competition among 
them. The audit monopoly has provided them with stability of income and a 
springboard for selling other services. Their income runs into hundreds of 
millions, and yet audit stakeholders have no way of checking the efficiency 
and standards of audit work. Cousins et al (1998) have drawn attention to this 
lack of accountability: 
 
‘In the absence of a ‘duty of care’ to individual stakeholders and public 
accountability, the auditing industry does not have a strong economic 
incentive to improve the quality of audits. If by hook or by crook a 
company survives, no external party knows that audits were botched. . 
. .  The auditing industry is pre-occupied with fees and client 
appeasement’. (p. 9.) 
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Cousins et al (1998) argue that auditing firms are concerned only with 
mechanical compliance with auditing standards rather than with audit quality; 
and that the whole emphasis is on covering up deficiencies. 
 
Table 1 Banks Audited by the Big Four Accounting Firms 
KPMG 
Professional 
Services 
Akintola Williams 
Deloitte  & Touche 
PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers 
Ernst 
&Young 
Access Bank Afribank BankPHB Skye Bank  
Guaranty Trust 
Bank 
Fidelity Bank Diamond Bank  
Wema Bank First Bank EcoBank  
Nigerian Int. Bank First Inland Bank FCMB  
Sterling Bank Union Bank IBTC Stanbic   
Standard 
Chartered 
Unity Bank Intercontinental 
Bank 
 
 United Bank of Africa Oceanic Bank  
 Equitorial Trust Bank Zenith Bank  
 Spring Bank Stanbic Bank  
 
SOURCE: Extracted from the Audited Reports of the various banks. 
Table 1 shows that KPMG Professional Services audited six banks, Akintola 
Williams Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers nine banks, and Ernst and 
Young one bank since the post-consolidation period. There has been 
discontent with the development and quality of audits produced by the big 
accounting firms, and it has been stated that ‘the crash of financial institutions 
in the Western countries has shown that foreign auditors are no better than 
their local counterparts’ (The Guardian, 9 August 2009). 
 
The attention of stakeholders has focused on auditors worldwide because of 
the belief that an auditor’s unqualified report signifies that a company is 
healthy. Before the CBN announced its findings on the state of affairs of the 
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banks and their activities in the Expanded Discount Window (EDW), the 
external auditors to these banks were unable to properly scrutinise and bring 
into the public domain the true state of these reports including their loan 
portfolio which CBN put at N2.8 trillion ($18.67 billion) (Business Day, 19 
August 2009). In 2007, the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) 
annual report showed signs of insolvency amongst Nigerian banks which 
indicated that four banks were sound, 17 were satisfactory, two were marginal 
and one was unsound (NDIC Annual Report, 2007), and yet the audit report of 
these banks had shown that they were sound (Daily Sun, 22 August 2009). 
 
As part of the statutory requirements of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
1990 (CAMA 1990) and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991 
(BOFIA 1991), external auditors of quoted companies are required to state 
that their financial statements of companies give a true and fair view of the 
state of the companies’ financial affairs (in this case the troubled banks) and 
that their profits and cashflows are in accordance with CAMA 1990 and 
BOFIA 1991 and the Nigerian Statement of Accounting Standards. In 
contrast, however, accounting has become a new exercise in creative fiction, 
with the result that banks are including many unreported non-performing 
interests in their statements of their financial position. As a consequence, the 
Deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Drugs, 
Narcotics and Financial Crimes has challenged the regulatory framework 
governing the relevant institutions charged with the responsibility of auditing 
and supervising the commercial banks (ThisDay, 18 August 2009). 
 
Table 2 below shows that the distressed banks received unqualified audit 
reports on their financial statements published immediately prior to the 
regulatory pronouncement of their financial difficulties. The evidence shows 
that audit opinions as contained in the banks’ annual reports were provided by 
the ‘big four’ accounting firms in Nigeria: Akintola Williams Deloitte (AWD); 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC); KPMG Professional Services; and Ernst & 
Young (E&Y). Despite the deepening financial crisis in Nigeria in 2009, 
auditors did not express any reservations about the value of non-performing 
loans or of any scenarios under which a company might not be able to honour 
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its obligations. However, just some few months later the regulators declared 
these banks to be distressed. The list of banks in Table 2 is useful for 
highlighting a number of issues. Thus, for instance, the Nigerian auditing 
standards require auditors to consider an ‘entity’s ability to continue in 
operational existence for the foreseeable future’, which ‘necessitates 
consideration of both the current and the possible future circumstances of the 
business and the environment in which it operates’ (Nigerian Auditing 
Standards, 2003). How the auditors constructed the audits to satisfy 
themselves that the banks below were going concerns is open to conjecture, 
because the financial difficulties of many banks became publicly evident only 
months after they had received unqualified audit reports. 
 
Table 2 Auditors and Distressed Banks 
Auditor’s 
Remuneration 
(N’millions) 
Bank Year end Auditor Date of  
last Audit 
report 
Audit 
Opinion 
2008 2007 
Afribank 31/3/2008 AWD Mar. 2008 Unqualified N/A N/A 
Finbank 31/4/2008 AWD & AI   Dec. 2008 Unqualified 67 63 
Union Bank 31/3/2009 AWD & BTN Oct. 2009 Unqualified 118 113 
Intercontinental 29/2/2008 PwC May 2008 Unqualified 208 112 
Oceanic Bank 31/12/ 2008 PwC May 2009 Unqualified 168   100 
Source: Extracted from the Annual Reports of the various banks. 
The nature of the recent banking crisis in Nigeria, which has resulted in 
concerns being voiced about the apparent lack of independence or technical 
incompetence of the auditors involved, has cast doubt on the functional 
capacity of audit technologies. Table 2 above shows the financial institutions 
which failed the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) audit in 2009, even though 
they had all received unqualified audit reports in the previous accounting year. 
For example, Oceanic Bank International Plc received an unqualified audit 
opinion on its annual accounts on 31 December 2008, followed by a ‘clean bill 
of health’ in respect of its annual accounts on 28 May 2009. The external 
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auditor of Oceanic Bank International Plc, one of the banks which was bailed 
out, was reported to have asserted that: 
 
‘We have audited the accompanying consolidated financial statements 
of Oceanic Bank International Plc ‘the bank’ and its subsidiaries 
(together ‘the group’) which comprises of the consolidated cash 
balance sheet as at 31 December 2008 and the consolidated profit and 
loss account and consolidated cash flow statements for the period 
ended and a statement of significant accounting policies and other 
explanatory notes. . . . In our opinion, the financial statement gives a 
true and fair view of the state of the financial affairs of the banks and 
group as at 31 December 2008 and of their profits and cash flows for 
the period ended in accordance with the Nigerian Statement of 
Accounting Standards, the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 and 
the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991.’ (Annual Report, 
2008, p. 31.) 
 
The CBN’s findings on Oceanic Bank International Plc appear to give a 
contrary view and raise questions on the credibility of the auditors especially 
on the disclosure of debt exposure (Business Day, 15 October 2009). Oceanic 
Bank’s annual report for the 2008 financial year shows that it had N5 billon 
($40 million) non-performing loans in 2007 and N36 billion ($288 million) in 
2008 (Annual Report, 2008, p. 53). However, by 14 August 2009, just three 
months later, the Central Bank of Nigeria had declared the bank unhealthy 
with N278.2 billion ($2.2 billion) non-performing loans representing 37 per 
cent of the total non-performing loans of the first five distress banks which 
was put at N747 billion ($5.98 billion) (ThisDay 25 August 2009; Newswatch, 
24 August 2009). This was against the bank’s 2008 figures for non-performing 
loans which stood at N36 billion ($288 million) (Annual Report, 2008, p. 53). In 
the case of Intercontinental Bank Plc, PwC did not qualify the audited report of 
the bank as at 14 May 2008 with about N16.6 billion (132.8 million) non-
performing loans, and yet the CBN report showed that the bank had N210.9 
billion ($1.69 billion) in non-performing loans representing 28 per cent of the 
total bad loans (This Day, 25 August 2009). 
 
The length of time it takes an external audit team to verify the complex 
operating activities of a bank with its networks of branches and to produce a 
statement of a bank’s financial position is in stark contrast to the length of time 
it has taken regulators to investigate and determine the financial inadequacies 
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of the banks concerned. Such a comparison of the time taken and the depth 
of work involved questions the level of assurance which is provided by 
standard audit investigations and also the source of evidence on which audit 
opinions are based. This suggests that an auditor’s assessment of the truth 
and fairness of a bank’s set of financial statements is influenced by 
assurances from the corporate manager. 
 
The increased commercialisation of the accounting profession and of the big 
four accounting firms and their emphasis on non-audit work has clear 
implications for auditor independence. Company auditors, the private ‘police 
force’ of capitalism, make millions of Naira in fees from company audits; and 
company audits are used to obtain easy access to senior management and to 
sell a variety of consultancy services. The fear of diversification of audit firms 
into other services areas compromises their independence and may result in 
the audit being sold as a ‘lost leader’ in the hope of selling the more profitable 
management consultancy services, with subsequent implications for audit 
quality. The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
Chairman, Farida Waziri, alleged that the auditors conspired with the 
managing directors of the erring banks to defraud those banks. She stated 
that: 
 
‘During our investigations, we found that all the erring bank chief 
executives were given a clean bill to operate by both the external and 
the internal auditors who are paid to do so. It was gathered that these 
auditors connived with the chief executives to cook the books and 
cover the tracks while the frauds were being perpetrated.’ (Saturday 
Tribune, 22 August 2009; ThisDay, 22 August 2009.) 
 
Table 2 above also shows that the auditors received a considerable income 
from their audit clients. Fee dependency and career advancement exert 
pressure on auditors to acquiesce with management, which can create a 
conflict of interest. PwC received N112 million ($896,000) (in 2007) and N208 
million ($1,66 million) (in 2008) in audit fees from Intercontinental Bank Plc 
(Annual Report, 2008, p. 82). During 2007, PwC collected N100 million 
($800,000) and N168.4 million ($1.35 million) in 2008 from Oceanic Bank 
International Plc. In 2009 PwC had a global gross revenue of $26.2 billion with 
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the Middle East and Africa, including Nigeria, contributing $704 million (PwC 
Global Annual Review, 2009, p. 43). The scale of fees raises questions about 
auditor independence. This suggests that auditors are too close to companies 
and that they ‘cannot bite the hand that feeds them’. How can one group of 
commercial entrepreneurs audit another group of commercial entrepreneurs? 
According to Sikka (2009) that model is broken and cannot work. 
 
In the case of Afribank Plc, Union Bank Plc and Finbank Plc, their accounts 
were audited by Akintola Williams Deloitte (AWD), another giant accounting 
firm, with a global revenue of nearly $26.1 billion in 2009, with auditing 
contributing $11.9 billion and Europe, the Middle East and Africa, including 
Nigeria, contributing $10.2 billion (Corporate Responsibility Report, 2009, p. 
35). It was reported in Union Bank Plc’s annual report that the joint auditors, 
AWD and Baker Tilly Nigeria, received N146 million ($1.17 million) in 2009, 
N118 million ($944,000) in 2008, and N113 million ($904,000) in 2007 as fees 
for audit and accountancy services from Union Bank Plc. On April 2009, AWD 
gave the accounts a clean bill of health, but barely six months later the bank 
was declared distressed. 
 
The contemporary auditing model makes auditors dependent on companies 
and their directors for fees and profits. As a result, auditors may become too 
subservient to directors and even ‘bend the rules’ in order to accommodate 
directors (Sikka, 2008a). Audit opinions are akin to a financial mirage (Sikka, 
2008).5 It has been argued that the basic audit model is faulty (Sikka, 2009; 
Sikka et al, 2009). Private sector auditors cannot be independent of the 
companies they audit. The auditing model in practice is further complicated by 
the fact that auditors are permitted to sell other accountancy services to their 
audit clients. This increases auditor fee dependency upon companies and can 
impair their perceived and actual independence. 
 
                                                 
5 Available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/18/marketturmoil.economi
cs/print accessed on 3 December 2009. 
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Concerns about auditing practices have been raised by a number of 
commentators. The shareholders, the majority of whom were investors in the 
affected banks, blamed the external auditors as well as the audit committees 
of the banks for negligence and compromise in carrying out their 
responsibilities (Guardian, 30 August 2009). One commentator said that the 
subjective nature of accounting and the tight relationship between accounting 
firms and their clients means that even the most honest and meticulous of 
auditors can unintentionally distort the numbers in ways that mask a 
company’s true financial status, thereby misleading investors, regulators, and 
sometimes management (The Sun, 1 September 2009). Patrick Gaye, an 
accountant, has drawn attention to the lack of auditor independence in that 
they were unwilling to expose the ‘shortcomings’ of the banks to the 
regulators: 
 
‘There was no way the auditors especially the external auditors could 
have done what is expected of them because, the external auditors in 
particular, are just like contractors who dance to the tune of their hirers. 
Auditors are on a retainership and for the banks to retain them on the 
job, they would not want to rock the boat through exposing the banks’ 
shortcomings to the regulators’. (Guardian, 30 August 2009.) 
 
It has been argued that, as a matter of law, external auditors are appointed by 
and are required to submit their reports to the shareholders during the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM), but that in practice the management of companies 
engage the services of the auditors which is ratified formally at the AGM by 
the shareholders who have little or no power at all to influence such 
appointment (Guardian, 28 August 2009). The biggest challenge that 
accountants in Nigeria face is that of satisfying public expectations that they 
will maintain high professional standards, ethical conduct and professional 
integrity. 
 
Auditors have been indicted for the crisis in the banking sector in Nigeria. 
There have been considerable concerns about audit quality, especially when 
companies experience unforeseen financial difficulties or collapse soon after 
receiving unqualified audit reports (Mitchell et al, 1992; Sikka, 2009, Sikka et 
al, 2009). What counts as ‘quality’ in auditing is inevitably the outcome of 
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power, politics and social relations (Power, 2003). However, the dominant 
view is that ‘quality’ or objectivity is constructed by using appropriate auditing 
techniques and having a good set of working papers to demonstrate 
professional judgement (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002). It has been argued that 
this worldview is deeply embedded within institutions and in a variety of 
auditing standards which require auditors to evaluate internal controls, 
conduct analytical reviews and to assess whether a bank is a going concern 
(Sikka et al, 2009). For example, PwC in its 2009 Global Annual Review drew 
attention, inter alia, to the breadth of its global network and the depth of its 
expertise: 
 
‘Around the world, our clients rely on PwC to help them explore 
opportunities and deal with complex business challenges. We work 
closely with our clients to deliver sustainable solutions, tapping into the 
breadth of our global network and our in-depth industry expertise’. (p. 
46.) 
 
Such professional market strategies lay claim to knowledge bases, equate 
quality with compliance with techniques and rules, and portray auditors as 
experts who can mediate uncertainty and construct an objective state of 
business affairs (Sikka et al, 2009). The evidence demonstrates, however, 
that the bodies which monitor their activities and supposedly uphold their 
professional standards are often not subject to any form of external scrutiny. 
The capitalist environment in which the accountants operate arguably allows 
auditors to engage in unethical related activities in order to boost profits. 
 
Regulators pay little attention to the social and organisational context of 
auditing. Little connection is made between the profit motive of accounting 
firms and how accountants are socialised in serving their clients (Grey, 1998; 
Leicht and Fennell, 2001; Gunz and Gunz, 2006; Suddaby, Cooper and 
Greenwood, 2007). Company audits, in common with other products and 
services, are manufactured within a social and organisational setting which 
naturalises worldviews and values, and which also have unanticipated 
outcomes (Sikka, et al, 2009). Individuals are subjected to performance 
appraisals, and their promotion and financial rewards often depend on their 
contribution to profits. Firms can increase profits by charging higher fees, but 
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in a competitive market clients may be able to resist such a move. As a 
consequence, accounting firms may use more junior auditors or change the 
mix of junior and senior staff to reduce costs. Femi Dinah, a partner of a 
Lagos-based chartered accounting firm and who defended the role of auditors 
in the recent banking crisis, observed that:  
 
‘It is not the job of the accountants to go deep into the papers. The law 
places the onus of preparing the account on the directors of the 
company. What the auditors are doing is to ascertain that the account 
is well prepared and that all the necessary checks and balances are 
there and that all the regulations that should have been followed are 
followed. If they see anything that is not proper in the account, it is their 
duty to point it out. You cannot really blame the accountant because 
some management hide things from the auditors.’ (Daily 
Independence, 28 September 2009.) 
 
It has been argued that the implication of accountants and auditors in 
professional misconduct in corporate Nigeria requires the professional 
accountancy bodies to exercise their statutory obligations and investigate and 
sanction their erring members (Bakre, 2007). However, the evidence 
presented in this paper supports the view of Bakre (2007) that the power and 
the privileges of self-regulation delegated to the professional bodies by the 
Nigerian government have been used to shield their members from any form 
of public scrutiny. Samuel Nzekwe, a former National President of the 
Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), has argued, however, 
that the current banking sector crisis in Nigeria has exposed ICAN, as its 
members were involved in various misdemeanours on the part of the banks 
(Nigerian Tribune, 14 December 2009). Nzekwe argued that, although the 
second Vice-President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN), Doyin, had claimed that ICAN had done all it could to discipline its 
erring members (as its disciplinary tribunal had the status of a federal court), 
this was misleading as ICAN was not capable of doing so (Nigerian Tribune, 
14 December 2009). According to Nzekwe, as none of the auditors who were 
implicated were prosecuted the need for new rules to curb ‘the excesses’ of 
bank officials and external auditors appeared to be unnecessary:  
 
‘None of the auditors that falsified the various accounts had been 
prosecuted, stating that calls for new rules to curb the excesses of the 
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banks’ officials and external auditors were unnecessary, as the 
prudential guidelines had always been there’. (Nigerian Tribune, 14 
December 2009.) 
  
Despite mass media reports and public outcry about alleged misbehaviour on 
the part of audit firms and members of ICAN in relation to the distressed 
banks, the accounting firms, AWD, PwC and KPMG, have maintained a 
questionable silence. In common with other jurisdictions, company directors 
can be held personally liable for publishing false and misleading accounts, but 
the same rule does not apply to auditors. Since the banking crisis, a number 
of bank executives and non-executive directors in Nigeria have been arrested 
and arraigned in court for their anti-social financial practices. What the 
regulator, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, simply did, 
however, was to invite the indicted auditing firm for a hearing but without 
imposing any penalties for its unethical practices.  
 
VI. Summary and Discussion 
This paper has sought to stimulate debate on contemporary auditing and the 
role of accountants and external auditors in the recent banking crisis in 
Nigeria. It has been argued that the deepening banking crisis poses questions 
about the purpose and value of external audits. Shareholders, depositors and 
even regulators do not seem to have been assured by unqualified audit 
opinions; and a number of banks have either had to face management 
restructuring or have had to be bailed out by the Central Bank of Nigeria even 
after receiving clean audit reports by their external auditors. The evidence 
shows that auditors lack their acclaimed expertise to conduct an independent 
and objective reporting of corporate affairs. 
 
An inquiry into the activities and involvement of accountants and external 
auditors in the falsification of company accounts in the recent banking crisis in 
Nigeria would help to draw public attention to the unethical practices of 
professionals and the shortcomings of current practices in Nigeria. Although 
audit reports are the public and visible evidence of an audit, little is known 
about the processes and organisational values associated with their 
production (Sikka, 2009). Such processes involve the management of labour, 
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economic incentives and the image of clients, the public and regulators. It has 
been argued in the literature (for example, by Halon (1994)) that audit staffs 
are inculcated to appease clients and to neglect wider social interests. As has 
been argued in this paper, in the pursuit of profit accountancy firms exert time 
and budget constraints and place pressure on audit personnel with the result 
that some have responded by adopting irregular practices and have even 
resorted to the practice of falsifying audit reports (Bakre, 2007).   
Although it is common practice for companies and their directors to 
select and remunerate auditors, it has been argued that such an audit model 
is fundamentally flawed and cannot deliver an independent or searching audit 
(Sikka et al, 2009). The flaws are further compounded by permitting auditors 
to have a direct economic interest in corporate transactions through the sale 
of accounting services. There is evidence to show that the commercialisation 
of professional firms enables them to act as a ‘watchdog’ on profits and, on 
occasions, appease and even collude with directors (Bakre, 2007; Sikka et al, 
2009). Their professional independence is indeed compromised because 
auditors are dependent on executive directors for their nomination, 
appointment and the determination of their fees, and, as a consequence, they 
cannot easily go against the interests of executive directors. To strengthen 
corporate reporting and auditing there should be corporate democracy in that 
stakeholders should have the power to determine who should be the auditor 
and how the auditor is to be remunerated. Further reforms could include 
imposing personal accountability for wrongdoing on all executive directors and 
finance directors of companies, and barring accounting firms involved in anti-
social financial practices from auditing and conducting other accounting-
related assignments and services. 
Although appeals to professional ethics and claims to be ‘serving the 
public’ may camouflage the capitalist nature of accountancy firms, they too 
are under systemic pressure to increase profits which are often realised by 
the adoption of predatory practices. This situation therefore questions the 
reliance on accountants and auditors, watchdogs and trust-engendering 
technology. Unethical practices are also present in the external auditing 
arena, a jurisdiction traditionally considered to be informed by professional 
codes of ethics (Bakre, 2007; Sikka, 2008a). In order to cement their 
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legitimacy as professionals known for their ‘integrity and ethical values’, a 
number of codes of ethics have been issued by the professional bodies which  
they claim promote the highest standards of competence, practice and good 
conduct. This paper argues, however, that firms do not seem to have been 
constrained by any notion of ethics or morality. The evidence shows that, 
despite acclaimed codes of ethics and claims to be promoting and protecting 
the public interest, there have been many reported cases of professional 
misconduct by accountants and auditors, and, as a result, such ‘professionals’ 
have adopted a compromising stance (see Bakre, 2007). The resignation of 
AWD as external auditors of Cadbury Nigeria Plc may imply that AWD did 
accept the charges of collusion with the management, even though it claimed 
that it had resigned to protect the best interest of shareholders and for 
reasons of corporate governance.  
The involvement of accountancy firms in anti-social practices in Nigeria 
has not been exposed or sanctioned by their professional bodies but by 
regulators (in the case of the recent banking crisis) and by whistleblowers (in 
the case of Afribank and Cadbury Nigeria Plc). Professionals have been 
implicated in unethical practices, but their role in such practices has rarely 
been investigated. Although section 368 of the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act 1990 creates civil liability for negligent auditors, liability is yet to be 
imposed. It has been argued that the compromising stance of the self-
regulatory professional bodies in sanctioning their erring members has been 
further facilitated by the non-interference attitude which has usually been 
adopted by the Nigerian government (Bakre, 2007). The Nigerian accounting 
professional bodies should ensure that they enforce and maintain their 
acclaimed duty to see that their members exercise due diligence and act in a 
morally and ethically upright manner and in the best interests of their clients 
and of the Nigerian public as a whole.  
This paper observes that professionals are under systemic pressure to 
increase profits. Without breaking the link between profits and professional 
rewards and personal penalties for erring professionals, there is little chance 
of professionals behaving responsibly. The professional bodies in Nigeria owe 
their clients and the general public, especially depositors, the moral and 
ethical duties which they claim to be exercising as the ‘watchdogs’ of their 
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members and in controlling the behaviour of their erring members. It is 
therefore suggested that the activities of erring professionals should be 
investigated by independent regulatory institutions in order to document their 
involvement in anti-social financial practices and for them to be sanctioned 
appropriately.  
Ex-post facto financial audits are often too late and cannot alert 
financial regulators to any problems. It is therefore necessary to ensure that 
audits of major companies, at least banks and financial institutions, are 
carried out directly by regulators. The Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigerian 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and other regulators should therefore establish 
their own dedicated teams of auditors to conduct continuous audits of all the 
major financial institutions. This should go beyond narrow market concerns 
about profits and should address questions about the financial institutions’ 
business models, viability, social accountability and their capacity to cause 
financial deficits. Audit by regulators has the advantage of independence and 
can address regulatory issues. However, accounting firms and companies 
who are used to ‘softer’ audits would no doubt fight tooth and nail to retain 
their privileges, but indulging accounting firms and paying out billions of Naira 
to rescue banks cannot, and should not, continue. 
To combat unethical practices by accountants and professional firms 
there is a need to educate company executives, policy-makers and the public 
about the human costs of anti-social and unprofessional practices, as they 
deprive ordinary Nigerian citizens of their human and social rights. Nigerian 
citizens suffer when banks and financial institutions collapse, causing 
depositors and investors to lose their investments. Many of the directors and 
senior officials of the distressed banks are still facing trial for their unethical 
behaviour, but the question is ‘Where were the auditors when those officials 
were perpetrating and misappropriating investors funds?’ The accounting 
profession in Nigeria must therefore continue to monitor development in the 
external and internal reporting environments through its audit, investigations 
and forensic accounting faculty and respond adequately (see Asein, 2009).  
The accounting and business literature does not alert readers to the 
fact that some professionals are engaged in anti-social financial practices to 
the detriment of society as a whole. The accounting and business literature 
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should therefore describe what is happening in practice. This would help 
develop new vocabularies and new policies to highlight and to bring to public 
attention the predatory nature of capitalism and the anti-social practices of 
some professionals working in the financial world. 
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